Coreper Revisited

David Bostock

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, vol. 40, issue 2, 215-234

Abstract: This article builds on earlier accounts of the work of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) in two ways. First, it examines the role played by members of the committee under legislative co‐decision. Members of Coreper (especially Coreper I) represent the Council in conciliation with the European Parliament and are increasingly involved in negotiations between Council and Parliament at earlier stages in the co‐decision procedure. Second, the article considers in what circumstances Coreper can make a significant contribution to decision‐taking within the Council. It suggests that this is most likely to occur in negotiation on issues which are both politically sensitive and technically complex; but that Coreper has no monopoly on such negotiations. Coreper should be thought of partly as a co‐ordinator of Council business, partly as a fixer and trouble‐shooter.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00352

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:215-234

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().