The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council

Axel Moberg

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, vol. 40, issue 2, 259-282

Abstract: The article examines debates on institutional reform in the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2000) that culminated in the Nice summit, and the effects of various proposals. The main issues were the indirect power Member States acquired through blocking minorities and how the outcome could be presented at home. The changes were rather modest, with two exceptions. A new population criterion gives Germany greater blocking power than the other large countries and preserves the possibility of three large countries together blocking in an EU of 27 members. Spain’s voting weight increased substantially. The new blocking possibilities will affect the relative bargaining position of countries rather than the Union’s decision‐making capability.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:259-282

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