The European Parliament in the Economic Governance of the European Union

Christopher Lord

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2003, vol. 41, issue 2, 249-267

Abstract: This article analyses how the European Parliament's contribution to policy outcomes varies across three branches of economic decision‐making and two roles typical of a parliamentary body. The former are based on Majone's distinction between stabilization, redistribution and regulation. The latter draw on Habermas's distinction between the role of the legislator in bargaining and preferences, and setting norms of collective action, which are taken here to include standards of public control and rights entitlements that must be secured in the delivery of policy.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:41:y:2003:i:2:p:249-267

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