 Cutting the Bank Down to Size: Efficient and Legitimate Decision‐making in the European Central Bank After EnlargementDorothee Heisenberg Journal of Common Market Studies, 2003, vol. 41, issue 3, 397-420 Abstract: This article examines the problems enlargement poses for one specific supranational organization, the European Central Bank (ECB). The article synthesizes three different literatures, on enlargement, ECB transparency and legitimacy, and effective monetary policy‐making, which up until now have not been linked. The three issues are related, and ought to be considered together when policy choices regarding institution‐building are made, because the choices in one issue constrain those in the others. Specifically, the argument is that transparency in the decision‐making process is key to allowing the denationalization of decision‐making to make it more effective. The more transparent the policy‐making process is, the easier it is to have a rotation of votes. Conversely, if the policy‐making process is opaque, a system of combining regions into one voting entity is better because the citizenry is represented in every vote, even if in a highly diluted fashion. The proposed ECB reform does not adequately address legitimate concerns on the part of the public as to how the decisions are made within the Governing Council. Date: 2003 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:41:y:2003:i:3:p:397-420 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell |
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