Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey

Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2003, vol. 41, issue 3, 495-518

Abstract: ‘Democratic conditionality’ is the core strategy of the EU to induce candidate states to comply with its human rights and democracy standards. How does it work and when is it effective? This article reports findings of a comparative study of ‘hard cases’: Slovakia under Meciar; Turkey; and Latvia. We argue that EU democratic conditionality is a strategy of ’reinforcement by reward’ which works through intergovernmental material bargaining. Its efficacy depends on the candidate governments' domestic political costs of compliance. By contrast, social influence and transnational mobilization have proved ineffective.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:41:y:2003:i:3:p:495-518

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