The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank
Jakob de Haan (),
Fabian Amtenbrink and
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2004, vol. 42, issue 4, 775-794
The European Central Bank (ECB) ranks highly on our proposed central bank disclosure indicator, measuring activities of central banks to enhance the public's understanding of their policies. Nevertheless, our survey evidence suggests that private‐sector economists do not consider the ECB transparent. We argue that this may be caused by the quality of the information provided by the ECB. In addition, the way intermediaries report on the ECB may influence the public's perceptions. The ECB also does not rank highly in terms of credibility; still, most ECB policy decisions were in line with financial markets' expectations.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:42:y:2004:i:4:p:775-794
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