Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU–Mexico Global Agreement*

Marcela Szymanski and Michael E. Smith

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2005, vol. 43, issue 1, 171-192

Abstract: The EU–Mexico Global Agreement is one of the most comprehensive agreements ever made by the EU with a non‐European country, and the first pact that Mexico has ever accepted that conditions the relationship on respect for democracy and human rights. This article explains why the EU insisted on such political conditions in the agreement, and why Mexico ultimately accepted the EU's terms after initially refusing them. As the economic case is only moderately compelling, we focus instead on the Commission's unique capacity to manipulate key elements of the negotiation process. The article also highlights the growing importance of two principles governing the EU's external relations ‐ coherence and political conditionality – and how those principles might further expand the EU's global political influence.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:43:y:2005:i:1:p:171-192

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