The Joint‐Decision Trap Revisited

Fritz W. Scharpf

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, vol. 44, issue 4, 845-864

Abstract: The original analysis appears as a basically valid ‐ if simplified ‐ account of the institutional conditions of political policy choices in the EU and their consequences. It needs to be complemented, however, by a similar account of non‐political policy‐making in the supranational‐hierarchical mode of governance by the ECB or ECJ.

Date: 2006
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