The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

Ansgar Belke and Barbara Styczynska

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, vol. 44, issue 5, 865-897

Abstract: This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, two classical power indices that have their origin in solutions to co‐operative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake of the continuous accession process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out to the status quo rule (‘one member, one vote’) with respect to the voting power of the ECB Executive Board and to the representativeness of European monetary policy, along with the potential for its renationalization.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00666.x

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Working Paper: The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model (2004)
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