Bringing Macroeconomics Back into the Political Economy of Reform: the Lisbon Agenda and the ‘Fiscal Philosophy’ of EMU*

Deborah Mabbett and Waltraud Schelkle

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, vol. 45, issue 1, 81-103

Abstract: The Lisbon Strategy supports reform of Member States' tax‐benefit systems while the ‘fiscal philosophy’ of the EMU postulates that governments should allow only automatic stabilizers, built into tax‐benefit systems, to smooth aggregate income. We ask whether these two pillars of EU economic governance are compatible. By exploring how structural reforms affect fiscal stabilization, we complement a political economy literature that asks whether fiscal consolidation fosters or hinders structural reforms. Using EUROMOD, a tax‐benefit model for the EU‐15, we identify the connections between specific tax and benefit reforms and the size of the stabilizers. We conclude that Lisbon‐type reforms may worsen the stabilizing capacity of tax‐benefit systems.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00704.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:45:y:2007:i:1:p:81-103

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().