Realist Power Europe? The EU in the Negotiations about China's and Russia's WTO Accession*

Hubert Zimmermann

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, vol. 45, issue 4, 813-832

Abstract: What determines the preferences the EU represents in international trade negotiations? This article argues that realist theories can help to answer this question. Whereas, the majority of the literature on EU trade policy‐making looks at ‘domestic’ variables such as institutional factors and the influence of interest groups, a systemic approach such as realism is rarely employed. However, as the empirical case studies of China's and Russia's WTO accession show, in international trade negotiations the EU is motivated by geoeconomic and mercantilist considerations to an important degree, specifically the interest to maximize EU wealth relative to other powers. The article is a pledge for taking realism seriously in research on preference formation in EU external policies.

Date: 2007
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