The EU's Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?*

Manfred Elsig

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, vol. 45, issue 4, 927-948

Abstract: This article focuses on the EU's strategy for choosing regulatory venues to negotiate trade agreements. It analyses the existence of a clear venue hierarchy since the late 1990s and the recent change leading to a blurring of any clear preference for using bilateral, inter‐regional or multilateral settings. The article challenges domestic explanations of the EU's choice of venue, stressing the autonomy of the Commission as a major factor. Using a principal‐agent framework, it shows that the Commission's agenda‐setting powers, the existence of interest divergence among principals (e.g. Member States, business groups) and the multi‐level system facilitate agency.

Date: 2007
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