The Barcelona Process and the Political Economy of Euro‐Mediterranean Trade Integration*

Marco Montanari

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, vol. 45, issue 5, 1011-1040

Abstract: The Barcelona Process aims to create a free trade area between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours by 2010. This article uses two‐level game theory to analyse the negotiations leading to the signature of the Euro‐Mediterranean Association Agreements. It argues that conflicts of interests between the actors involved in the bargaining process are responsible for the restrictive nature of the agreements, characterized by agricultural protectionism, long transition periods and small amounts of financial support allocated by the EU to its partners. These provisions have prevented the Barcelona Process from significantly boosting Euro‐Mediterranean bilateral trade in the last few years.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:45:y:2007:i:5:p:1011-1040

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