Behind the Veil of Budgetary Discipline: The Political Logic of the Budgetary Rules in EMU and the SGP*

Mathieu Segers and Femke van Esch

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, vol. 45, issue 5, 1089-1109

Abstract: The outcome of the 2003 compliance crisis showed once and for all that the nature of the stability and growth pact (SGP) is highly political. While the existing literature often presents the content of EMU and SGP as an unqualified triumph for the German financial elite, the available primary sources point in quite another direction.

Date: 2007
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