Instrumental and Constitutional Differentiation in the European Union

Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2014, vol. 52, issue 2, 354-370

Abstract: Differentiation has become a salient feature of European integration. Yet systematic empirical evidence is lacking about its origins, duration and variation across countries and policies. This article provides such evidence from a new data set on differentiation in European Union treaty law. In addition, it is argued that two logics of treaty‐based differentiation are at work. ‘Instrumental differentiation’ originates in enlargement and is motivated by efficiency and distributional concerns. ‘Constitutional differentiation’ has its origins in treaty revisions and is motivated by concerns about national sovereignty and identity. It is driven by Eurosceptic Member States that are opposed ideologically, or fear popular resistance, to the supranational centralization of core state powers.

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12103

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:52:y:2014:i:2:p:354-370

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().