Integration without Representation? The European Parliament and the Reform of Economic Governance in the EU
Berthold Rittberger
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2014, vol. 52, issue 6, 1174-1183
Abstract:
While the Lisbon Treaty has been heralded as victory for the European Parliament, the crisis‐related reforms of the European Union's economic governance regime are commonly being considered to have empowered governments and supranational institutions – such as the Commission and ECB – at the expense of the EP and national parliaments. This article argues that the picture is more nuanced than suggested by the conventional wisdom: legitimacy‐seeking and interinstitutional bargaining arguments, which have been applied effectively to account for the expansion of the EP's power in the past, highlight the conditions under which the EP's struggle for more institutional power is either met with success (as in the case of the single supervisory mechanism) or faces virtually insurmountable obstacles (as in the case of the Troika and the European Stability Mechanism).
Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12185
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:52:y:2014:i:6:p:1174-1183
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