Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa
Karen Del Biondo
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2015, vol. 53, issue 2, 237-254
Abstract:
This article investigates the causes for instrumental variation in EU democracy promotion in Africa. Can instrumental variation better be explained from a realist or from an idealist perspective? Realism would predict that sanctions are more likely in the absence of historical, security or commercial interests. Idealism would suggest that sanctions are more likely in the case of grave violations of democracy and human rights, in countries that are unstable and economically underperforming, and when there is pressure from regional organizations and domestic actors. Empirically, the article compares two cases (Guinea and Niger) where the EU imposed sanctions and two non-cases (Ethiopia and Rwanda) where the EU was reluctant to do so. Contrary to the prevalent thesis in the literature, the article finds stronger evidence for idealism (which is confirmed in all the cases) than for realism (which is only confirmed in the cases of Guinea and Ethiopia).
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:53:y:2015:i:2:p:237-254
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