A New Form of Delegation in EU Asylum: Agencies as Proxies of Strong Regulators

Ariadna Ripoll Servent

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2018, vol. 56, issue 1, 83-100

Abstract: The malfunctioning of the Common European Asylum System can be traced back to the principle of responsibility established by the Dublin regime. To attenuate its problems, the EU has delegated regulatory competences to Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which have been given a ‘right to intervene’ in those Member States that put the system at risk. This article expands Majone's typologies of agents and trustees to explain why and how power has been delegated and the resulting consequences. It includes cases of failed delegation and argues that, although Frontex and EASO should operate as trustees – to prevent co†operation from breaking down – they have not been provided with enough autonomy, which exposes them to capture by particular interests. The reforms show that EU agencies are likely to be used as proxies by a group of strong Member States to monitor and intervene in weaker Member States.

Date: 2018
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