 Concluding Early Agreements in the EU: A Double Principal†Agent Analysis of Trilogue NegotiationsTom Delreux and Thomas Laloux Journal of Common Market Studies, 2018, vol. 56, issue 2, 300-317 Abstract: Applying a principal†agent perspective on trilogue negotiations, this article examines how the rapporteur and the Presidency, as agents of respectively the European Parliament and the Council, are able to reach a deal with their fellow agent while avoiding an involuntary defection among their principals. Despite these intra†and inter†institutional constraints, early agreements can be concluded because agents execute two parallel tasks on behalf of their principals: representing them inter†institutionally and acting as the deal†facilitator intra†institutionally. We identify three ways in which the agents can combine these two acts of delegation and conclude an early agreement: (1) creating a tied†hand situation for themselves; (2) affecting the intra†institutional coalition formation by bringing in allies from the other institution; and (3) actively searching for signals from the principals and the fellow agent on the zone of possible agreement. We illustrate these dynamics through a case study of the policy†making process on the 2015 Decision on the Market Stability Reserve. Date: 2018 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:56:y:2018:i:2:p:300-317 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.