Some Reflections on the Governance Framework of the Single Resolution Board

Marta Božina Beroš

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2018, vol. 56, issue 3, 646-655

Abstract: First embodied by the European Supervisory Authorities in 2010, agency governance in the financial sector has gained momentum with the creation of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – an EU agency with considerable competencies in banking prudential policy. Within a short period, backed by the ‘ESMA†Short Selling case’ judgment, agencies have progressed from supporting the European Commission with their quasi†rule making, to a more prominent role in the decision†making process, potentially influencing policy†makers' agenda. By engaging in a qualitative analysis of legal documents, official texts and relevant scholarship, this research note examines the formal framework and practical aspects of SRB's governance, in order to substantiate whether its establishment presents a ‘qualitative increase’ in financial sector agencification. At the same time, the research note highlights problematic issues arising because of the limitations set by the Meroni doctrine arguing that the Board's wide powers ‘on paper’ may prove challenging to implement in practice.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:56:y:2018:i:3:p:646-655

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