The Trio Presidency and the Efficiency of Council Decision‐Making: An Empirical Study

Philippe van Gruisen

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2019, vol. 57, issue 4, 692-709

Abstract: Does the trio presidency system enhance efficiency in EU legislative decision‐making? Since 2007, fixed groups of three Member States have been required to set a joint 18‐month agenda, with each Member State taking 6‐month turns at the presidency. To date, however, there has been no empirical evidence that either confirms or refutes the notion that this system is efficient. In a study of the duration of Council decision‐making on 1,927 legislative proposals for the 2000–12 period, we obtain empirical support for the hypothesis that a common agenda leads to a significant decrease in the amount of time needed to reach a first agreement on regulations, directives and decisions. In addition, we show that the requirement to pre‐negotiate the agenda helps to moderate the effect of political conflict on the speed of decision‐making, thereby offering support to the recent decision to proceed with the trio presidency system until at least 2030.

Date: 2019
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