While We Are Waiting for the Superbug: Constitutional Asymmetry and EU Governmental Policies to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance

Carsten Strøby Jensen

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2020, vol. 58, issue 6, 1361-1376

Abstract: This article analyses how constitutional asymmetry in EU health policy affects EU‐governmental initiatives to combat antimicrobial resistance (AMR). AMR has been viewed as one of the biggest threats to public health that will arise during the next two to three decades, both within the EU and globally. During the last decade the EU has taken a number of initiatives to combat AMR. The article finds that constitutional asymmetry in health policy has a major influence on how EU‐AMR policies are developed and implemented. Policies relating to promotion initiatives (like selling pharmaceuticals in the EU) are implemented through hard law types of governance (directives and regulations), while policies more directly aiming at reducing the consumption of antimicrobials are implemented through soft law initiatives (open methods of coordination).

Date: 2020
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