Requesting Trade Sanctions? The European Parliament and the Generalized Scheme of Preferences

Katharina L. Meissner

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2021, vol. 59, issue 1, 91-107

Abstract: Trade policy is among the EU's major capabilities to promote fundamental rights in developing countries. Conditionality clauses thus accompany EU trade agreements and tariff preferences under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Yet while conditionality in trade agreements have come under the spotlight and the EP has stepped up its engagement in this area of decision‐making, the GSP has largely not been addressed in scholarly debate. This article fills this void in the literature by exploring the conditions under which the EP asks for trade sanctions on beneficiaries of the GSP. I argue that the EP invests political resources in a beneficiary when this country is salient under EU development cooperation. Hence, I observe a horizontal spill‐over effect whereby EP trade activities are driven by a country's salience in the area of development cooperation. However, this effect occurs only in the absence of security interests and the lack of development performance.

Date: 2021
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