Completing Banking Union? The Role of National Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Shifting Member States' Preferences on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme

Mario Tümmler

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2022, vol. 60, issue 6, 1556-1572

Abstract: The gridlock on the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), the missing pillar of the banking union, is most commonly attributed to moral hazard concerns on the side of Germany. However, Member State preferences on EDIS cannot be understood solely based on concerns over pre‐emptive risk reduction. Instead, banking sector interests connected to the institutional setup and legal status of national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) have also informed these preferences. This article examines the development of preference formation on EDIS for the cases of Germany, Italy and France after the initial 2015 proposal failed. National preferences on the institutional setup of EDIS have become more aligned with a reinsurance system that maintains existing DGS. Hence, current trajectories point to a discussion over how national DGSs are to be linked in a reinsurance system, instead of a discussion about whether it should be abandoned or not.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13318

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:60:y:2022:i:6:p:1556-1572

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().