Friend Zone Forever? The Essence of and Justifications for the EU's Decision‐Making Autonomy

Marja‐Liisa Öberg

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2023, vol. 61, issue 6, 1622-1638

Abstract: The expansion of the European Union's (EU) regulatory sphere creates conflicts of sovereignty between the EU and its member states, and third countries that lack a possibility to participate in the making of those laws and policies. The conflict is epitomised in the concept of the Union's decision‐making autonomy. Albeit stringently applied, the concept is ambiguous and undefined. This article endeavours to unfold its meaning, use and significance and examine whether its rigid nature is justified in light of the Union's aims to expand its regulatory sphere. The article argues that the ultimate rationale of decision‐making autonomy is to ensure the effectiveness of the EU legal order and to compensate for the member states' loss of sovereignty, investment and risk‐taking. Insofar as non‐member states do not demonstrate similar commitment to the EU, exclusion from decision‐making is justified to retain the privilege and attractiveness of membership.

Date: 2023
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