Unpacking the European Commission: Cabinet Composition and EU Policy‐Making

William T. Daniel and Steffen Hurka

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2025, vol. 63, issue 3, 987-1007

Abstract: We examine bureaucratic politics within the European Commission, using novel data on the backgrounds of individual members of Commissioners' cabinets. Although cabinet composition has become increasingly regulated in recent decades, its selection remains a key area for personalised political appointments within an organisation more commonly known for its collective responsibility and lack of individual influence. Using data on the personal and professional backgrounds of cabinet members since the first Barroso Commission, we trace how administrative reforms meant primarily to ‘de‐nationalise’ the selection of appointees have led to changes in cabinet composition. We then explore how cabinet composition impacts on the complexity of Commission proposals and its subsequent inter‐institutional negotiations. We find that whilst more diversity of Commission cabinets clearly enhances the input legitimacy of the EU's legislative process, it neither benefits nor threatens the quality of the Commission's policy proposals or how they are processed politically.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13678

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:63:y:2025:i:3:p:987-1007

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().