DYNAMIC INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH UNCORRELATED PRIVATE INFORMATION AND HISTORY-DEPENDENT OUTCOMES

Gérard Gaudet, Lasserres Pierre and Ngo Long

The Japanese Economic Review, 1996, vol. 47, issue 4, 321-334

Date: 1996
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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Incentive Contracts with Uncorrelated Private Information and History Dependent Outcomes (1995)
Working Paper: Dynamic Incentive Contracts with Uncorrelated Private Information and History Dependent Outcomes (1993)
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