OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT*

Dyuti Banerjee, Tanmoyee Banerjee (chatterjee) and Ajitava Raychaudhuri
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee) ()

The Japanese Economic Review, 2008, vol. 59, issue 4, 519-535

Abstract: In this paper we study the mix of anti‐copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti‐copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00424.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:59:y:2008:i:4:p:519-535

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1352-4739

Access Statistics for this article

The Japanese Economic Review is currently edited by Akira Okada

More articles in The Japanese Economic Review from Japanese Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().