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Optimal Debt Contracts with Renegotiation

Murat Usman ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2004, vol. 13, issue 4, 755-776

Abstract: This paper sutudies the role of debt in committing a seller not to trade at a low price. We consider a discrete‐time finite‐horizon buyer–seller relationship. The seller makes an upfront relationship‐specific investment, which is financed with debt. Debt then is repaid gradually to mitigate the hold‐up risk. Even though debt is renegotiable, under the assumption that with a small probability renegotiation may fail and may lead to inefficient liquidation, debt still can be used as a commitment device. We solve for renegotiation proof dynamic debt contracts that are optimal for the seller and show that debt is repaid over the entire course of the relationship with declining repayments.

Date: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:13:y:2004:i:4:p:755-776