Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay

Daniel Houser and John Wooders

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2006, vol. 15, issue 2, 353-369

Abstract: Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x

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