EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Almost Common Value Auctions: An Experiment

Susan L. Rose and John Kagel

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2008, vol. 17, issue 4, 1041-1058

Abstract: In almost common value auctions one bidder has a higher (private) value for the item than the other bidders. Theory predicts that even a small private value advantage can have an explosive effect in English auctions, with advantaged bidders always winning and sharp decreases in revenue. These predictions fail to materialize for experienced bidders who have learned to avoid the worst effects of the winner's curse. Bidding is better characterized as proportional, with advantaged bidders tending to bid as in a pure common value auction after adding their private value advantage to their estimated value of the item.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00204.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:17:y:2008:i:4:p:1041-1058

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:17:y:2008:i:4:p:1041-1058