Price Competition When Consumers Are Uncertain about Which Firm Sells Which Quality

Jean Gabszewicz and Isabel Grilo

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1992, vol. 1, issue 4, 629-50

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the properties of price equilibria in a duopoly market where firms sell vertically differentiated products, consumers being uncertain about which firm sells which quality. Both existence and properties of price equilibria are characterized by the beliefs of the consumers' population about the distribution of quality between firms. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Price Competition When Consumersare Uncertain About Which Firm Sells Which Quality (1992)
Working Paper: Price competition when consumers are uncertain about which firm sells which quality (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:4:p:629-50

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().