Price Competition When Consumersare Uncertain About Which Firm Sells Which Quality

Jean Gabszewicz and Isabel Grilo

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1992, vol. 1, issue 4, 629-650

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the properties of price equilibria in a duopoly market where firms sell vertically differentiated products, consumers being uncertain about which firm sells which quality. Both existence and properties of price equilibria are characterized by the beliefs of the consumers' population about the distribution of quality between firms.

Date: 1992
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00629.x

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Journal Article: Price Competition When Consumers Are Uncertain about Which Firm Sells Which Quality (1992)
Working Paper: Price competition when consumers are uncertain about which firm sells which quality (1992)
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