Autonomy and Monitoring

Marco a. Barrenechea‐méndez, Pedro Ortín‐Ángel and Eduardo C. Rodes
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pedro Ortín Ángel

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2016, vol. 25, issue 4, 911-935

Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under‐explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal‐agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue‐collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.

Date: 2016
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12164

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