Motivate and select: Relational contracts with persistent types

Radoslawa Nikolowa ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2017, vol. 26, issue 3, 624-635

Abstract: We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be adopted in complex jobs and when high talent is not too common or too rare. Firms with “normal” jobs are more likely to adopt termination contracts. In labor market equilibrium, different contracts may be adopted by ex ante identical firms. Hence, we offer an explanation for the coexistence of different employment systems within the same industry.

Date: 2017
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12201

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Working Paper: Motivate and Select: Relational Contracts with Persistent Types (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:26:y:2017:i:3:p:624-635

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