Noncompete agreements, training, and wage competition

Oz Shy and Rune Stenbacka

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2023, vol. 32, issue 2, 328-347

Abstract: We study the effects of noncompete agreements in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer‐provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare. Firms earn higher profits and pay lower average wage when they require workers to sign noncompete agreements.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:32:y:2023:i:2:p:328-347

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