Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition
Pradeep Chintagunta and
Dipak C Jain
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1995, vol. 4, issue 1, 109-31
Abstract:
Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed. Copyright 1995 by MIT Press.
Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Related works:
Journal Article: Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition (1995) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:4:y:1995:i:1:p:109-31
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... ref=1058-6407&site=1
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().