Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship

Marc Bilodeau () and Al Slivinski ()

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998, vol. 7, issue 4, 551-571

Abstract: This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self‐interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.

Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00551.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1997)
Working Paper: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1994)
Working Paper: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:7:y:1998:i:4:p:551-571

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