Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship
Marc Bilodeau () and
Al Slivinski ()
No 9709, University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series from University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the private interest of the entrepreneur to impose a non-distribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm. This decision also results in greater voluntary contributions than if the firm is proprietary.
Keywords: DECISION MAKING; ENTREPRENEURSHIP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H42 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Journal Article: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1998) 
Working Paper: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1994)
Working Paper: Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship 
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