IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?

Erin L. Krupka and Roberto Weber

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013, vol. 11, issue 3, 495-524

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary? (2008)
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