Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency, and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy
Fabio Schiantarelli (),
Massimiliano Stacchini and
Philip E. Strahan
Journal of Finance, 2020, vol. 75, issue 4, 2139-2178
Italian firms delay payment to banks weakened by past loan losses. Exploiting Credit Register data, we fully absorb borrower fundamentals with firm‐quarter effects. Identification therefore reflects firm choices to delay payment to some banks, depending on their health. This selective delay occurs more where legal enforcement of collateral recovery is slow. Poor enforcement encourages borrowers not to pay when the value of their bank relationship comes into doubt. Selective delays occur even by firms able to pay all lenders. Credit losses in Italy have thus been worsened by the combination of weak banks and weak legal enforcement.
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Working Paper: Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy (2019)
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