Price-Matching Policy and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation

Zhong Zhang

Journal of Industrial Economics, 1995, vol. 43, issue 3, 287-99

Abstract: This paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations, a price-matching policy, and their prices sequentially and independently, both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1995
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