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COSTLY BUYER SEARCH IN LABORATORY MARKETS WITH SELLER ADVERTISING*

Timothy Cason () and Shakun Mago ()

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, vol. 58, issue 2, 424-449

Abstract: In this experiment, sellers simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies. Buyers either purchase at an advertised price or search sequentially for other prices. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, sellers charge a high unadvertised price or advertise a price chosen from a lower interval. Increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and affect equilibrium advertising intensity. Empirical results are consistent with most comparative static predictions. Sellers, however, price much lower and advertise more intensely than predicted. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a perfect information, Bertrand‐like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy equilibrium with significant seller market power.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00413.x

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Working Paper: Costly Buyer Search in Laboratory Markets with Seller Advertising (2008) Downloads
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Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

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