Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure

Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta () and Thomas Rønde

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2012, vol. 60, issue 4, 599-608

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Exclusive dealing: investment promotion may facilitate inefficient foreclosure (2011)
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DOI: 10.1111/joie.2012.60.issue-4

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