Procuring Survival

Matilde Cappelletti, Leonardo M. Giuffrida and Gabriele Rovigatti

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2024, vol. 72, issue 4, 1451-1506

Abstract: We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large‐scale dataset of firms—covering balance‐sheet, income‐statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close‐call auctions, we find that winners are more likely to stay in the market than marginal losers after the award and that the boost in survival chances lasts longer than the contract duration. We document that this effect is associated with earnings substitution rather than increased business scale and that survivors experience no productivity premium. Securing contracts relaxes credit constraints and acts as a mechanism for survival.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12395

Related works:
Working Paper: Procuring survival (2024)
Working Paper: Procuring Survival (2024)
Working Paper: Procuring Survival (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jindec:v:72:y:2024:i:4:p:1451-1506

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industrial Economics is currently edited by Pierre Regibeau, Yeon-Koo Che, Kenneth Corts, Thomas Hubbard, Patrick Legros and Frank Verboven

More articles in Journal of Industrial Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().