EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002

Yael V. Hochberg, Paola Sapienza and Annette Vissing‐jørgensen
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Annette Vissing-Jorgensen

Journal of Accounting Research, 2009, vol. 47, issue 2, 519-583

Abstract: We evaluate the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) on shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders in order to affect the final implemented rules under SOX. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation. Such firms appear to be characterized by agency problems, rather than motivated by concerns over compliance costs. Cumulative stock returns during the five and a half months leading up to SOX passage were approximately 7% higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against SOX disclosure‐related provisions than for similar non‐lobbying firms, consistent with an expectation that SOX would reduce agency problems. Analysis of returns in the post‐passage implementation period suggests that investors' positive expectations with regards to the effects of these provisions were warranted.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00321.x

Related works:
Working Paper: A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:joares:v:47:y:2009:i:2:p:519-583

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-8456

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Accounting Research is currently edited by Philip G. Berger, Luzi Hail, Christian Leuz, Haresh Sapra, Douglas J. Skinner, Rodrigo Verdi and Regina Wittenberg Moerman

More articles in Journal of Accounting Research from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-24
Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:47:y:2009:i:2:p:519-583