Explaining Sales Pay Strategy Using Agency, Transaction Cost and Resource Dependence Theories*

Michel Tremblay, Jérôme Côté and David B. Balkin

Journal of Management Studies, 2003, vol. 40, issue 7, 1651-1682

Abstract: ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to investigate, using data gathered from 325 French‐Canadian organizations, the influence of key constructs related to agency, transaction cost and resource dependence theories on the proportion of salary in sales compensation. Usefulness analysis showed that performance information (9 per cent), uncertainty (8 per cent) and dependence resource (5 per cent) constructs have a significant incremental contribution to sales compensation. Regarding specific hypothesis tests, results of full model show that the capacity to observe behaviour, team sales and financial resources offered are associated with an increased use of salary pay. In contrast, adaptability of product/service‐related resources, salesforce experience and high marginal salesforce productivity are associated with decreased use of the salary component. However, the results of full model have failed to support the direction or influence of relationships between programmability, span of control, market and selling uncertainty, the predominance of salespeople and TCA measures on proportion of salary. The results support the argument that integration of multiple theoretical perspectives better explains pay policy.

Date: 2003
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