Competitive Actions under Analyst Pressure: The Role of CEO Time Horizons

Jianhong Chen, Wan‐Chien Lien, Danny Miller and Tianxu Chen

Journal of Management Studies, 2024, vol. 61, issue 5, 1916-1945

Abstract: Leveraging upper echelons theory and the Awareness‐Motivation‐Capability (AMC) framework of competitive dynamics, we investigate the moderating influence of CEO time horizons on the relationship between negative analyst recommendations and the temporal patterning of competitive actions. We argue that negative recommendations are associated with less intensity but greater irregularity in competitive actions. Moreover, CEO time horizons weaken these effects, such that CEOs with longer time horizons are less influenced by such recommendations. Results from a longitudinal study of 296 CEOs from 2004 to 2015 support these arguments. Our study contributes by underscoring CEO time horizon as a critical contingency in studying the impact of analyst pressures.

Date: 2024
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