An Alternative Approach to Valence Advantage in Spatial Competition

Guillaume Hollard and Stéphane Rossignol

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 10, issue 3, 441-454

Abstract: This paper explores a two‐candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate has a valence advantage. Contrary to previous models, we introduce a multiplicative advantage, rather than an additive one. This takes into account the possible interaction between the quality of a candidate and his policy platform. This leads to a strikingly different model, in which all extreme voters support the favored candidate.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00371.x

Related works:
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
Working Paper: An alternative approach of valence advantage in spatial competition (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:3:p:441-454

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().