Journal of Public Economic Theory

1999 - 2020

Current editor(s): Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

From Association for Public Economic Theory
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Track citations for all items by RSS feed
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 22, issue 3, 2020

Contribution to a public good under subjective uncertainty pp. 473-500

Anwesha Banerjee and Nicolas Gravel

Wage endogeneity, tax evasion, and optimal nonlinear income taxation pp. 501-531

Firouz Gahvari and Luca Micheletto

Redistributive innovation policy, inequality, and efficiency pp. 532-554

Parantap Basu and Yoseph Getachew

Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology pp. 555-582

Alejandro Caparrós and Michael Finus

Trust, ability‐to‐pay, and charitable giving pp. 583-629

Ida Ferrara and Paul Missios

The importance of considering optimal government policy when social norms matter for the private provision of public goods pp. 630-655

Guy Meunier and Ingmar Schumacher

Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications pp. 656-697

Bernardo Guimaraes, Caio Machado and Ana E. Pereira

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets pp. 698-728

Tadashi Morita, Yukiko Sawada and Kazuhiro Yamamoto

Competition, patent protection, and innovation with heterogeneous firms in an endogenous market structure pp. 729-750

Keishun Suzuki

International capital market and repeated tax competition pp. 751-768

Satoshi Kasamatsu and Hikaru Ogawa

Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing pp. 769-820

Giuseppe Attanasi, Kene Boun My, Marco Buso and Anne Stenger

Can everyone benefit from economic integration? pp. 821-833

Christopher P. Chambers and Takashi Hayashi

Volume 22, issue 2, 2020

An introduction to the second special issue commemorating works of James Andreoni, Theodore Bergstrom, Larry Blume, and Hal Varian pp. 279-284

Olivier Bochet, Nikos Nikiforakis, Ernesto Reuben, John Wooders and Myrna Wooders

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality pp. 285-301

Marta Faias, Emma Moreno‐García and Gareth D. Myles

Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public‐good economies pp. 302-319

Anne van den Nouweland and Agnieszka Rusinowska

Charitable asymmetric bidders pp. 320-337

Olivier Bos

Global public goods and unilateral matching mechanisms pp. 338-354

Wolfgang Buchholz and Weifeng Liu

Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games pp. 355-370

César Mantilla, Rajiv Sethi and Juan-Camilo Cardenas

Warm glow and the transmission of pro‐socialness across generations pp. 371-387

Ngo Long

Cooperation in a risky world pp. 388-407

Vincent Théroude and Adam Zylbersztejn

The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating pp. 408-432

Marco Faillo, Daniela Grieco and Luca Zarri

The effect of religion on Muslims’ charitable contributions to members of a non‐Muslim majority pp. 433-448

Rebecca Morton, Kai Ou and Xiangdong Qin

Principles versus principal: Reconciling norm compliance and shareholder value pp. 449-467

Bernard Sinclair‐Desgagné

Volume 22, issue 1, 2020

Attending to inattention: Identification of deadweight loss under nonsalient taxes pp. 5-24

Giacomo Brusco and Benjamin Glass

Tying the politicians’ hands: The optimal limits to representative democracy pp. 25-48

Didier Laussel and Ngo Long

Regulation and altruism pp. 49-68

Izabela Jelovac and Samuel Kembou Nzale

The evasion of fiscal and labor regulations: Firm behavior and optimal tax policy pp. 69-97

Katherine Cuff, Steeve Mongrain and Joanne Roberts

When the light shines too much: Rational inattention and pandering pp. 98-145

Federico Trombetta

Distributive politics of public goods networks through multistage voting pp. 146-169

Kengo Kurosaka

Group identification with (incomplete) preferences pp. 170-189

Wonki Jo Cho and Alejandro Saporiti

Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare pp. 190-219

Tetsuo Ono

Choosing the agent's group identity in a trust game with delegated decision making pp. 220-244

Alexander Zimper and Nicky Nicholls

Valuations and dynamics of negotiations pp. 245-273

Armando Gomes

Volume 21, issue 6, 2019

The political sustainability of a basic income scheme and social health insurance pp. 971-990

Mathias Kifmann and Kerstin Roeder

Use it or lose it pp. 991-1016

Fahad Khalil, Doyoung Kim and Jacques Lawarree

Job protection, housing market regulation, and the youth pp. 1017-1036

Antoine Bonleu, Bruno Decreuse and Tanguy van Ypersele

Long‐term care and intrafamily moral hazard: Optimal public policy pp. 1037-1055

Justina Klimaviciute

The determination of public tuition fees in a mixed education system: A majority voting model pp. 1056-1073

Hejer Lasram and Didier Laussel

Optimal antibribery policy when bribery type is endogenous pp. 1074-1106

Fuhai Hong and Zhendong Yin

Border tax adjustments and tariff‐tax reforms with consumption pollution pp. 1107-1125

Nikos Tsakiris, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Michael Michael

Spillover feedback loops and strategic complements in R&D pp. 1126-1142

Evangelia Chalioti

Poverty, competition, democracy, and ownership: A general equilibrium model with vertical preferences pp. 1143-1178

Amani Kahloul, Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed and Hejer Lasram

Giving at the close: Experimental evidence on cooperation in contributing to a public good pp. 1179-1199

Yuval Arbel, Ronen Bar‐El, Mordechai E. Schwarz and Yossef Tobol

Spillovers, subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D pp. 1200-1220

Rabah Amir, Huizhong Liu, Dominika Machowska and Joana Resende

Public goods, voting, and growth pp. 1221-1265

Kirill Borissov, Joseph Hanna and Stéphane Lambrecht

Optimal interregional redistribution and local borrowing rules under migration and asymmetric information pp. 1266-1285

Darong Dai, Liqun Liu and Guoqiang Tian

Licensing versus assignment: Innovation transfer in an asymmetric duopoly pp. 1286-1308

Shuai Niu

Optimal fiscal policy in a model with inherited aspirations and habit formation pp. 1309-1331

Stéphane Bouché and Carlos de Miguel

Volume 21, issue 5, 2019

Introduction to the JPET special issues commemorating works of James Andreoni, Theodore Bergstrom, Larry Blume, and Hal Varian pp. 799-803

Olivier Bochet, Nikos Nikiforakis, Ernesto Reuben, John Wooders and Myrna Wooders

James Andreoni and the quest for others in our utility functions pp. 804-811

Manuel Muñoz‐Herrera and Nikos Nikiforakis

Building rational cooperation on their own: Learning to start small pp. 812-825

James Andreoni, Michael Kuhn and Larry Samuelson

Taxation, redistribution, and observability in social dilemmas pp. 826-846

Daniel Brent, Lata Gangadharan, Anca Mihut and Marie Claire Villeval

Intragroup competition in public good games: The role of relative performance incentives and risk attitudes pp. 847-865

Annarita Colasante, Aurora García‐Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Andrea Morone and Tiziana Temerario

On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information pp. 866-894

Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg

Constrained public goods in networks pp. 895-902

Nizar Allouch and Maia King

Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games pp. 903-922

Edward Cartwright, Anna Stepanova and Lian Xue

Public policy, dynamic status preferences, and wealth inequality pp. 923-944

Evangelos Dioikitopoulos, Stephen J Turnovsky and Ron Wendner

Political contestability and public contracting pp. 945-966

Marian Moszoro and Pablo Spiller

Volume 21, issue 4, 2019

A pure hedonic theory of utility and status: Unhappy but efficient invidious comparisons pp. 601-621

Pascal Courty and Merwan Engineer

Set them (almost) free: Discretion in electoral campaigns under incomplete information pp. 622-649

Vardan Baghdasaryan and Elena Manzoni

Industry equilibrium with random exit or default pp. 650-686

Svetlana Boyarchenko and Piin‐Hueih Chiang

On the distributional effects of commodity taxation pp. 687-707

Oriol Carbonell‐Nicolau

Optimal mixed taxation, credit constraints, and the timing of income tax reporting pp. 708-737

Robin Boadway, Jean-Denis Garon and Louis Perrault

Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting pp. 738-753

David Collie

Equilibrium audit strategies against tax treaty shopping pp. 754-770

Sunghoon Hong

Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach pp. 771-793

Koichi Futagami, Toshihiro Matsumura and Kizuku Takao

Volume 21, issue 3, 2019

Pollution effects on preferences: A unified approach pp. 371-399

Stefano Bosi, David Desmarchelier and Lionel Ragot

Price–quality competition in a mixed duopoly pp. 400-432

Tilman Klumpp and Xuejuan Su

Rewarding idleness pp. 433-459

Andrea Canidio and Thomas Gall

On optimal redistributive capital taxation pp. 460-487

Leslie Reinhorn

Participation constraints of matching mechanisms pp. 488-511

Weifeng Liu

Optimal human capital policies under the endogenous choice of educational types pp. 512-536

Takuya Obara

Lobbying and the international fight against tax havens pp. 537-557

Tobias Hauck

Housing choices, sorting, and the distribution of educational benefits under deferred acceptance pp. 558-595

Jing Xu

Volume 21, issue 2, 2019

Commuting in Happyville: Taxation with interjurisdictional commuting and pollution pp. 201-218

Sophie Legras

Nash equilibrium and party polarization in an electoral model with mixed motivations pp. 219-240

Shino Takayama, Yuki Tamura and Terence Yeo

Dynamic implications of tourism and environmental quality pp. 241-264

Bazoumana Ouattara, Agustín Pérez‐Barahona and Eric Strobl

Present bias and corporate tax policies pp. 265-290

Minwook Kang and Lei Sandy Ye

Multiple equilibria and global indeterminacy in an endogenous growth model with congestible public goods pp. 291-309

Giovanni Bella and Paolo Mattana

Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance pp. 310-331

Laszlo Goerke

Tax evasion, social norms, and economic growth pp. 332-346

Carlos Bethencourt and Lars Kunze

The social cost problem, rights, and the (non)empty core pp. 347-365

Stéphane Gonzalez, Alain Marciano and Philippe Solal

Volume 21, issue 1, 2019

Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment pp. 5-43

Craig Brett and John Weymark

Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory? pp. 44-61

Marco Sahm

Anticorruption reforms, tax evasion, and the role of harassment pp. 62-80

Dyuti S. Banerjee and Samarth Vaidya

Tax havens, income shifting, and redistributive taxation pp. 81-97

Yu‐Bong Lai

Equalizing tax bases or tax revenues under tax competition? The role of formula apportionment pp. 98-115

Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel

Government expenditure, external and domestic public debt, and economic growth pp. 116-134

Cuong Le Van, Phu Nguyen-Van, Amélie Barbier‐Gauchard and Duc‐Anh Le

Population growth: A pure welfarist approach pp. 135-166

Thomas I. Renström and Luca Spataro

An informational role of supermajority rules in monitoring the majority party's activities pp. 167-196

Daiki Kishishita